It is agreed that the objective of Russian President Vladimir Putin in his invasion of Ukraine is to install a puppet regime there, malleable to the interests of Moscow. If so, it is part of the same approach Russia has taken in its forays into Africa in recent years.
Building on the model used in Syria, Russia supports its “proxies” (intermediaries) in Libya, the Central African Republic, Mali and Sudan. Moscow is also eyeing half a dozen African leaders who are, to varying degrees, vulnerable.
In doing so, the interests and sovereignty of African citizens gave way to Russian priorities.
This strategy of elite co-optation mirrors Russia’s strategic goals in Africa . This initially consists of establishing a foothold in the southern Mediterranean and the Red Sea, potentially allowing Russia to threaten NATO’s southern flank and create bottlenecks in international maritime trade. .
Second, this approach would demonstrate Russia’s status as a great power whose interests must be taken into account throughout the world.
Third, it aims to displace Western influence in Africa, while undermining any support for democracy.
Russia has always used illegal means to achieve its goals on the continent. In particular, it has deployed mercenaries, conducted disinformation campaigns, interfered in elections and bartered arms for resources. This cost-effective approach, which is yielding very good results, has allowed Moscow to further expand its influence in Africa arguably faster than any other external actor since 2018, when Moscow stepped up its engagements in Africa. .
Unfortunately for African citizens, these tactics are all inherently destabilizing. Moreover, they end up depriving Africans of their rights while weakening their sovereignty.
Russia’s growing influence portends a bleak outlook for Africa’s future. Indeed, Russia is trying to export its model of governance— authoritarian, kleptocratic and transactional —to Africa.
Given that at least a handful of African leaders want to follow his path, this commitment is particularly problematic. Never mind the democratic aspirations of the vast majority of African citizens .
The UN vote on the Russian invasion of Ukraine provides a relevant prism for understanding relations between Moscow and certain African countries. It reveals a wide spectrum of governance norms and visions in Africa. It is through these goals and interests that interest groups from African countries can be expected to engage with Russia in the future, which will have far-reaching implications for democracy, continental security and sovereignty.
Puppets, sponsors and opposition
The vote on the UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russian aggression was opposed by only one African voice, that of Eritrea. The African Union and ECOWAS have joined in strong condemnations of the Russian attack on Ukraine. The current AU chairperson, Senegalese President Macky Sall, as well as AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat, have also criticized Russia’s unprovoked war.
In all, 28 of the 54 African countries voted to condemn the Russian invasion, 16 countries abstained and 9 did not vote. Ultimately, the vote proved a remarkable condemnation from Moscow of a continent where the worldview of many leaders is shaped by a posture of non-alignment, the result of a still-living legacy of the Cold War, African diplomatic politeness and a desire to remain neutral in the face of great power rivalries.
The vote also brought to light a growing segmentation of governance norms in Africa and demonstrated that Africa’s relationship with Russia will henceforth be neither uniform nor abruptly challenged**.
African countries that abstained or did not vote did so for different reasons. The category of countries refusing to condemn Russia is the most obvious: that of the leaders who have been co-opted by Moscow, including Fustain-Archange Touadéra of the Central African Republic, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Bourhane of Sudan, and Malian Colonel Assimi Goita.
These leaders do not enjoy legitimacy in their countries and depend on the political support of Moscow and its mercenaries to cling to power.
The second category of countries that abstained or did not vote includes countries with which Russia has paternalistic ties with their leaders. These are the leaders of countries such as Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Mozambique, South Sudan, Uganda, or even Zimbabwe, all of whom benefit from armaments, disinformation campaigns or political support. These leaders also have no interest in democratic processes that could undermine their grip on power.
Some countries—such as Morocco, Namibia, Senegal, and South Africa—that abstained or did not vote are likely motivated by ideological reasons rooted in their traditions of non-alignment. But while they maintain relations with Moscow, they are nonetheless bewildered by its imperialist actions and, in general, support respect for international law to maintain peace and security.
The countries that voted to condemn the invasion are large democracies or in the process of democratization such as Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Kenya, Seychelles, Sierra Leone and Zambia. Again, their motivations are diverse, but their average score on Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Index is 20 points higher than those of countries that did not vote for condemnation.
The eloquent speech of Kenya’s Ambassador to the United Nations , Martin Kimani, in which he championed respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and the peaceful resolution of disputes, defines the vision of this group and its support for a rules-based international system. Many of these countries have also taken the lead in condemning the wave of coups and third terms in the continent .
Priority actions
If the past can serve as an example, one can expect that, in reaction to its international isolation after the invasion of Ukraine, Russia will intensify its campaign of influence in Africa.
In order to mitigate the bad Russian influence, African and international actors who wish to promote a democratic rules-based international system must take decisive action.
First, invest in institutions and partners for democracy. A system of democratic checks and balances remains the best protection against harmful external influences.
Second, the coups and third terms must be strongly condemned.
Third, building the capacity and scope of African journalists is crucial. Without free and informed discourse it is difficult to conduct a national dialogue on national priorities and preferences, and also to hold their actions accountable.
Fourth, the Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa , which entered into force in 1985, must be strengthened. The latter prohibits African states from allowing the deployment of mercenaries on their territory and should be used to ban Wagner from the continent.
Fifthly, to strengthen democracy, we must invest in the professionalization of African armies . A growing number of African armies have become politicized, contributing to an increase in coups and instrumentalizing armies to suppress political opponents.
Strengthening the civic action of Africans is also very important. It is possible to counter the bad Russian influence by strengthening civil society in Africa to ensure that independent voices are not silenced. Society must redouble its vigilance to demand transparency on the opaque contracts that underlie this paternalism that reinforces these co-opted regimes.
Another way to strengthen African self-reliance is to support the efforts of regional organizations like the African Union. Indeed, the AU and regional economic communities have adopted charters that promote democratic norms and processes. These institutions can support democratic norms when they are flouted and can reduce the scope for outside influence.
At the international level, democratic governments need to nurture enduring partnerships with their African counterparts. The resulting stability will have a beneficial effect on all partners, particularly in terms of security, governance and investments. Such enduring engagements are at odds with the purely transactional and targeted relations of Russia’s elites in Africa.
African countries whose leaders are legitimately elected should not, however, be forced to choose between international partners. African governments naturally want to have multiple partnerships, depending on their own context and interests. This is quite normal, given the legacy of colonialism and the struggles for independence that were at the origin of the creation of many African states. Rather, the priority of such partnerships should be to focus on how to find and put into practice, with the widest possible consensus, a shared vision that is underpinned by an international rules-based system.
There exists today in Libya, a microcosm which is revealing of these competing visions. The UN-backed government voted to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. He is also trying to organize elections in which 2.7 million Libyans have registered. But Russia is sabotaging these efforts in an attempt to install its own “proxy”, Khalifa Haftar by using its mercenaries, misinformation and political expediency. The consequences for all of Africa are obvious.
In the end, Russia only offers African leaders coercive tools. If these are weakened, so too will Russia’s destabilizing influence on the continent.
Source: The Conversation Media Group Ltd